The tools for image manipulation detection are treated under feature fusion and decision fusion scenarios.
Introduction
The sophisticated and low-cost tools of the digital age enable the creation and manipulation of digital images without leaving any perceptible traces. As a consequence, one can no longer take the authenticity of images for granted, especially when it comes to legal photographic evidence. Image forensics, in this context, is concerned with reconstructing the history of past manipulations and identifying the source and potential authenticity of a digital image. Manipulations on an image encompass processing operations such as scaling, rotation, brightness adjustment, blurring, contrast enhancement, etc. or any cascade combinations of them. Doctoring images also involves the pasting one part of an image onto another one, skillfully manipulated so to avoid any suspicion.
One effective tool for providing image authenticity and source information is digital watermarking. 1 An interesting proposal is the work of Blythe and Fridrich 2 for a secure digital camera, which losslessly embeds the photographer's iris image, the hash of the scene image, the date, the time, and other camera/picture information into the image of the scene. The embedded data can be extracted later to verify the image integrity, establish the image origin, and verify the image authenticity ͑identify the camera and the photographer͒. However, its use requires that a watermark be embedded during the creation of the digital object. This limits watermarking to applications where the digital object generation mechanisms have built-in watermarking capabilities. Therefore, in the absence of widespread adoption of digital watermarking technology ͑which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future͒, it is necessary to resort to image forensic techniques. Image forensics can, in principle, reconstitute the set of processing operations to which the image has been subjected. In turn, these techniques not only enable us to make statements about the origin and veracity of digital images, but also may give clues as to the nature of the manipulations that have been performed.
Several authors have recently addressed the image forensic issue. Popescu et al. 3 showed how resampling ͑e.g., scaling or rotating͒ introduces specific statistical correlation, and described a method to automatically detect correlations in any portion of the manipulated image. Avcibas et al. 4 developed a detection scheme for discriminating between "doctored" images and genuine ones based on training a classifier with image quality features, called "generalized moments." Both methods are, however, limited to a subset of doctoring operations. Johnson and Farid 5 described a technique for estimating the direction of an illuminating light source, based on the lighting differences that occur when combining images. Popescu and Farid 6 quantified the specific correlations introduced by color filter array ͑CFA͒ interpolation and described how these correlations, or lack thereof, can be automatically detected in any por-tion of an image. Fridrich et al. 7 investigated the problem of detecting the copy-move forgery and proposed a reliable method to counter this manipulation.
The problem addressed in this paper is to detect doctoring in digital images. Doctoring typically involves multiple steps, which typically involve a sequence of elementary image-processing operations, such as scaling, rotation, contrast shift, smoothing, etc. Hence, to tackle the detection of doctoring effects, we first develop single tools ͑experts͒ to detect these elementary processing operations. Then we show how these individual "weak" detectors can be put together to determine the presence of doctoring in an expert fusion scheme. Novel aspects of our work in this paper are the following. First, we introduce and evaluate features based on the correlation between the bit planes as well the binary texture characteristics within the bit planes. These are called binary similarity measures ͑BSMs͒ as in Ref. 8 . We compare their performance against two other categories of tools that were previously employed for image forensics and steganalysis, namely, IQMs ͑image quality measures͒ 9, 10 and HOWS ͑higher order wavelet statistics͒.
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Second, we unify these three categories of features, IQMs, BSMs, and HOWSs, in a feature scenario. The cooperation between these feature categories is attained via a feature selection scheme formed from the general pool. It is shown that the feature fusion outperforms classifier performance under individual category sets. Third, we conduct both controlled and uncontrolled experiments. The controlled experiments are carried on a set of test images using imageprocessing tools to give us insight into the feature selection and classifier design. An example of controlled experiment is the blurring of the whole image and its detection with a classifier that may be clairvoyant or blind. The uncontrolled experiments relate to photomontage images, where we cannot know specifically the manipulation tools used and where only parts of the image are modified with a cascade of tools. An example of the photomontage effect is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where the head of the central child in Fig. 1͑a͒ is replaced with the head borrowed from the image in 1͑b͒, after an appropriate set of manipulations such as cropping, scaling, rotation, brightness adjustment, and smoothing along boundaries. The resulting image is given in Fig. 1͑c͒ .
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the forensic image features utilized in developing our classifiers or "forensic experts." Section 3 presents a detailed account of controlled and uncontrolled experiments. Conclusions are drawn in Sec. 4.
Forensic Features
Investigation of sophisticated manipulations in image forensics involves many subtleties because doctoring operations leave weak evidence. Furthermore, manipulations can be cleverly designed to eschew detection. Hence, an image must be probed in various ways, even redundantly, for detection and classification of doctoring. Furthermore, discriminating features can be easily overwhelmed by the variation in image content. In other words, the statistical differences due to image content variation can confound statistical fluctuations due to image manipulation. It is, thus, very desirable to obtain features that remain independent of the image content, so that they would reflect only the presence, if any, of image manipulations. The three categories of forensic features we considered are as follows:
1. IQMs. These focus on the difference between a doctored image and its original version. The original not being available, it is emulated via the blurred version of the test image. The blurring operation purportedly removes additive high-frequency disturbance due to certain types of image manipulations to create a version of the untampered image. The 22 IQMs considered in Refs. 9 and 10 range from block SNR to spectral phase and from spectral content to Spearman rank correlation. 2. HOWS. These are extracted from the multiscale decomposition of the image. 11 The image is first decomposed by separable quadrature mirror filters and the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the subband coefficients at each orientation and scale are computed. The number of HOWS features is 72. 3. BSMs. These measures capture the correlation and texture properties between and within the lowsignificance bit planes, which are more likely to be affected by manipulations. 8, 12, 13 The number of BSM features is 108.
Joint Feature Set (JFS).
We have considered the pooled set consisting of the three categories of features, namely the union of the IQM, BSM, and HOWS sets. This provides a large pool of features to choose from, that is, 108 BSMs, 72 HOWS, and 8 IQM features; overall, 188 features. 5. Core Feature Set (CFS). We decided to create a core set, fixed in terms of the number and types of features, to meet the challenge of any potential manipulation. The motivation for this smaller core set of unique features was to avoid the laborious process of feature selection for every new scenario. In other words, we envision a reduced set of features standing ready to be trained and used as the challenge of a new manipulation scenario arises. Obviously the performance of the CFS, which can only for classifier weights, would be inferior to the performance of the JFS, which can both chose features and train classifier weights. The common core of features was extracted as follows. We select the first feature from the set of 188 available features, as the one that results in the smallest average error of the semiblind classifiers ͑defined later͒; the second one is selected out of remaining 188− 1 features, which, as a twosome feature, results in the smallest average classification error, and so forth.
The feature selection process was implemented with the sequential forward floating search, ͑SFFS͒ method.
14 The SFFS method analyzes the features in ensembles and can eliminate redundant ones. Pudil et al. 14 claims that the best feature set is constructed by adding to and/or removing from the current set of features until no more performance improvement is possible. The SFFS procedure can be described as follows:
1. Choose from the set of K features the best two features; i.e., the pair yielding the best classification result. 2. Add the most significant feature from those remaining, where the selection is made on the basis of the feature that contributes most to the classification result when all are considered together. 3. Determine the least significant feature from the selected set by conditionally removing features one by one, while checking to see if the removal of any one improves or reduces the classification result. If it improves, remove this feature and go to step 3, otherwise do not remove this feature and go to step 2. 4. Stop when the number of selected features equals the number of features required.
The SFFS was run for each type of image manipulation, for the category of manipulations, for the pooled categories. The litmus test for feature selection was the performance of the regression classifier. 15 To preclude overtraining the classifier, we upper bounded the number of features selected by 20. This means that, e.g., at most 20 BSM features could be selected from the 108 features in this category. On the other hand, for the joint set and for the core set, the upper bound of feature population was set to 30. Often, however, the selection procedure terminated before the upper bound was reached.
We used the following definitions of classifiers:
1. Clairvoyant classifier. This is the classifier trained for a specific manipulation at a known strength. For example, we want to distinguish pristine images from the blurred ones, where the size of the blurring function aperture was n pixels. Obviously, this case, where one is expected to know both the manipulation type and its parameters is somewhat unrealistic in practice, but it is otherwise useful for understanding the detector behavior.
2. Semiblind classifier. This is the classifier for a specific manipulation at unknown strength. For example, we want to determine whether an image has been blurred after its original capture, whatever the blur size. 3. Blind classifier. This is the most realistic classifier if one wants to verify whether or not an image has been tampered with. For example, given an image downloaded from the Internet, one may suspect that it might have been manipulated, but obviously one cannot know the type͑s͒ of manipulations.
To motivate the search for forensic evidence, we illustrate the last three bit planes of the "Lena" image, when the latter was subjected to blurring, scaling, rotation, sharpening, and brightness adjustment, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. As shown in these examples, image manipulations alter to varying degrees the local patterns in bit planes ͑Fig. 2͒ as well as across bit planes ͑Fig. 3͒. Consequently, the statistical features extracted from the image bit planes can be instrumental in revealing the presence of image manipulations. Since each bit plane is also a binary image, it is natural to consider BSMs as forensic clues. BSMs were previously employed in the context of image steganalysis. 10, 12 Similarly, these disturbance patterns will affect the wavelet decomposition of the image and the predictability across bands, which can be captured by HOWS. Finally, a denoising operation on the image will remove the content but will bring forth patterns similar to those shown in Figs. 2 and 3. Features trained to distinguish these patterns take place in the repertoire of IQMs. Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of three selected features, each from one category, vis-à-vis the strength of manipulation. The continuous dependence of sample measures, the Sneath and Sokal 16 measure of BSMs; the normalized correlation measure of IQMs; and variance of vertical subband of HOWS ͑all to be defined in the following subsections͒ on the strength parameter for three types of manipulation is revealing.
BSMs
BMSs for images and their steganographic role were discussed in Refs. 4, 12, and 17 and Appendix A details concerning them. We conjecture that they can play an effective role in the evaluation of doctored images. Consider for example, the Ojala histogram as one of the BSM features. Figure 5͑a͒ shows in the left column the 256-level graylevel histograms of the "Lena" image side by side with the 512-level Ojala histograms in the right column. The first row contains the respective histograms of the original images, while the following rows show the respective histograms in the manipulated images. Notice that while the gray-level histograms remain unperturbed, the Ojala histograms are quite responsive to the type of manipulation. For example, sharpening flattens the histogram, while rotation and blurring causes the probability of certain patterns to peak. The sensitivity of the Ojala histograms to manipulations can be quantified in terms of distance functions. In this paper, bit plane pairs 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, 6-7, and 7-8 for the red channel and bit plane pair 5-5 of the red and blue channels were used; in other words, the BSM features from these plane pairs were offered to the feature selector. The formulas for these BSMs are given in Table 1 and also reported in Ref. 12 . Columns 3 to 11 indicate with a checkmark whether or not that feature was chosen by the SFFS algorithm. To give an example, the features most contributing to the "sharpen" manipulation are the Kulczynski similarity measure 1, the Sneath and Sokal similarity measures 1, 2, 3, and 5, Ochiai similarity measure, binary min histogram difference, binary absolute histogram difference, binary mutual entropy, binary Kullback-Leibler distance, Ojala mutual entropy and Ojala Kullback-Leibler distance.
In Table 1 , as well as Tables 2 and 3 of IQM and HOWS features, respectively, we present in columns 3 to 9 the semi-blind cases that is, when the detector knows the specific manipulation, but not its strength. For example, the classifier is trained to differentiate between original and blurred images, while being presented with images subjected to a range of blurring degrees. The last two columns ͑10 and 11͒ of the tables require special attention. Column 10 ͑JFS͒ is the blind manipulation case, that is, the classifier does not know the type and strength of the manipulation, if there is any, and is trained with all sorts of image manipulations. Finally, column 11 ͑CFS͒ shows the features selected by the core set. Notice that the format of Table 3 HOWS͒ is different than those of Tables 1 and 2 since we are not using the SFFS procedure for the HOWS method in single semiblind sets; SFFS is used only in the CFS.
IQMs
IQMs were employed in Ref. 9 in the context of both passive and active warden image steganography schemes. These measures address various quality aspects of the difference image between the original and its denoised version. Among the 22 candidate measures investigated, the survivors of the SFFS selection procedure are listed in Table 2 . To give a flavor of these features, the crosscorrelation measure, appearing in the second row of this table, was illustrated Fig. 4͑b͒ . Notice the almost linear dependence of the cross-correlation measure versus the strength of the image manipulation operation. Different than the BSM case, where only one spectral component was used, the IQMs are calculated using all three color components. Notice, for example that, the SNR feature suffices all by itself to discriminate the "sharpen" manipulation from among the IQMs.
HOWS
The HOWS features 3, 5, 6 are obtained via a decomposition of the image using separable quadrature mirror filters. This decomposition splits the frequency domain into multiple scales and orientations, in other words, by generating vertical, horizontal, and diagonal subband components. Given the image decomposition, a first set of statistical features is obtained by the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the coefficients of the n subbands. These four moments, computed over the three orientations and n subbands make up 4 ϫ 3 ϫ ͑n −1͒ features. A second set of statistics is based on the norms of the optimal linear predictor residuals. For purposes of illustration, consider first a vertical band V i ͑x , y͒ at scale I and use the notation V i ͑x , y͒, H i ͑x , y͒, and D i ͑x , y͒, respectively, for the vertical, horizontal and diagonal subbands at scale i =1, ... ,n. A linear predictor for the magnitude of these coefficients can be built using the intraand intersubband coefficients. For example, for the vertical i'th subband with w k denoting the scalar weighting coefficients one has the residual term e v,i ͑x , y͒:
The prediction coefficients and hence the prediction error terms can be estimated using the Moore-Penrose inverse. An additional statistical set of 4 ϫ 3 ϫ ͑n −1͒ features can be collected from the mean, vaeiance, skewness, and kurtosis of the prediction residuals at all scales. The final feature vector is 24͑n −1͒ dimensional, e.g., 72 for n = 4 scales ͑here n = 1 represents the original image͒. When the HOWS features where subjected to the SFFS selection procedure in the blind manipulation scenario, the following 16 features were selected. Recall that the CFS and the JFS were selected from the pool of all 188 features. The 16 shown in the Table 3 represent the portions of HOWS features in the core set.
Experimental Results and Detection
Performance In our experiments we built a database of 200 natural images. These images were expressly taken with a single camera ͑Canon Powershot S200͒. The reason is that each camera brand possesses a different CFA, which may impact on the very features with which we want to detect alterations. 17 The database constructed with a single camera eliminates this CFA confounding factor.
The image alterations we experimented with were scaling up, scaling down, rotation, brightness adjustment, con- 
Ochiai similarity measure
Binary Lance and Williams nonmetric dissimilarity measure
Binary mutual entropy
Ojala mutual entropy 18 For example, in the scaling-up manipulation, images were enlarged by six factors, namely, by 1, 2, 5, 10, 25, and 50%, resulting in 1200 scaled-up images. In all cases, half of the images were randomly selected for training, and the remaining half was used for testing. Thus, the total image database with manipulations climbed up to 6200. Table 4 lists the manipulations and their strength parameters.
Assessment of Feature Sets
We ran experiments to assess the power of feature sets in all modes, namely, clairvoyant, semiblind, and blind.
Clairvoyant mode
In this case, the detector is aware of the specific manipulation as well as of its strength. Figure 6 illustrates the relative competition between each method ͑clairvoyant mode͒ 
Mean angle similarity against different manipulation types, and the JFS that outperforms all. One can see from this figure that, while the performance of methods may vary much from manipulation to manipulation, the JFS is always the best performing one. More explicitly, the SFFS was run separately for the IQM, BSM, HOWS, and JFS sets, and each feature set was optimized for the specific manipulations. Figure 7 illustrates the competition between feature categories, where a separate detector was trained for each manipulation type, but with unknown strength. Here we limit ourselves to two illustrative cases, one where HOWS outperform the others ͑manipulation by rotation͒ and another where BSM outperforms all others ͑manipulation by contrast enhancement͒. Notice that the fourth bar has the richest feature selection from BSM+ IQM+ HOWS, hence it is always better.
Semiblind mode
In this case, the detector is aware of the specific manipulation, but not of its strength, which could vary as in Table 4 . For example, we generate a separate image pool from the settings of 25, 10, 5, and 2% scaling-up parameter, and train the corresponding "scaling-up forensic detector." The SFFS outcomes for the BSM and IQM sets were already exemplified in Tables 1-3 , respectively. One can notice in Fig. 8 that each feature category has its own strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis the manipulations and that it is not possible to determine a single winner category for all cases. However, when we allow the selection algorithm to pick up features from the pooled IQM, BSM, and HOWS sets, the detection performances are always better. It is intriguing to discover the proportions of feature categories taking role in the classifications. The percentages of features derived from respective BSM, IQM, and HOWS categories are illustrated in Fig. 9 . The enrollment percentages of categories vary widely from case to case, though in general the BSM and HOWS features dominate
Blind mode
Finally we designed blind classifiers, that is, classifiers that are independent of the manipulation type and of its strengths. This classifier was designed using training and test sets incorporating images that were manipulated with all items in Table 4 . The corresponding performance results of this blind classifier are given in Figs. 10 and 11 . The following comments are in order:
1. The classifier designed from pooled features outperforms the classifiers that were designed with features from a single category, be it BSM, IQM, or HOWS ͑Fig. 10͒. As expected, the JFS, which optimizes its feature set and classifier weight for the occasion, is better than the CFS, which can only optimize its classifier weights for a fixed set of features. 2. The left bars ͑JFS͒ in Fig. 11 denote the performance of semiblind classifiers ͑specific for a manipulation͒. Note here that there is not much of a performance difference between the JFS trained to detect all manipulations, as in Fig. 10 , and the JFSs trained to detect just one specific manipulation. Obviously these bars are the same as the rightmost bars in Fig. 8.  3 . The right bars ͑CFS͒, on the other hand, correspond to the classifier performance when the core subset of features were used, but trained separately for each type of manipulation. In this case, only the weights differ in the regression equations, but the type and number of features are the same. The results with the CFS are slightly inferior to the JFS set, as expected. The bar in Fig. 11 denotes the average of the CFS performance. 4. Figure 12 shows pie charts of features derived from the three categories. The left figure shows the portions of the three categories in the JFS case and the right in the CFS case. Notice that the BSM features dominate in the CFS, while in the JFS case the HOWS features dominate.
Finally, it would have been desirable to establish patterns or trends in the selection of features against specific manipulations for a better intuitive understanding of the problem. However, no clear trend was observable.
Performance with Uncontrolled Experiments
To test our scheme in a more realistic environment, we considered images doctored by extra content insertion and replacement of the original content, e.g., as in Fig. 1 . This is in contrast to the experiments in Sec. 3.1, where the whole image was subjected to one manipulation type at a time. Instead, in uncontrolled experiments, sequences of image manipulation take place in image patches, with possible forgery intention.
In the first round of experiments, we used a set of 20 images, all captured with the same camera to preclude the nuisance of different camera parameters. We spent some effort to make them look like natural images to avoid any suspicion. To this effect, the inserted content was resized, rotated and/or brightness adjusted before being pasted onto the image, the parameters of these manipulations being adjusted with visual fitness criteria. Sample images that have undergone doctoring operations are shown in Fig. 13 . We took two untampered and one tampered block from every image, to create a repertoire of 40 untampered and 20 tampered blocks. The block sizes were varying but the smallest block size was 100ϫ 100, while the original image sizes were 640ϫ 480. The manipulated regions of the image, like the heads in Figs. 1 and 13͑a͒ and the people in Fig. 13͑b͒ , fitted into the block size. Notice that one does not exhaustively search with blocks positioned over all possible pixels. Instead, one is tempted to test the suspected regions, like persons, faces, etc.
We tested these images using all the six semiblind, that is, manipulation-specific, classifiers, since any one or more of the manipulation types could have taken place. We declared "a manipulation has occurred" in a block whenever any one of the semiblind detectors gave an alarm. In other words, the binary decision was taken with decision fusion from the six manipulation experts using the binary sum rule. False positives occur if an untampered block is erroneously declared as "manipulated"; similarly, false negatives result when all six experts fail to see evidence of manipulation for a block that was actually manipulated. Table 5 shows the results for the image blocks on generic classifiers. The performance of blind classifiers are listed in Table 6 . As a further proof of the viability of our scheme, we captured 100 images from the Internet with obvious tampering clues. Sample images are displayed in Fig. 14 . We tested these images on semi-blind and blind classifiers ͑see Tables 7 and 8͒. Notice that for the images downloaded from the Internet, the tests are on the whole image, and not on a block basis.
Conclusions
We developed an image forensic scheme based on the interplay between feature fusion and decision fusion. We considered three categories of features, namely, the binary similarity measures between the bit planes, the image quality metrics applied to denoised image residuals, and the statistical features obtained from the wavelet decomposition of an image. These forensic features were tested against the background of single manipulations and multiple manipulations, as would actually occur in doctoring images. In the first set of single-manipulation experiments, we observed that each feature category has its weak and strong points vis-à-vis manipulation types, and that it is best to select features from the general pool of all categories ͑feature fusion͒. In the second set of experiments with multiple manipulations, the best strategy was to use different types of classifiers ͑experts͒ one per manipulation, and then fuse their decisions.
Further issues that remain to be explored are as follows: ͑1͒ The implementation of the decision fusion with alternative schemes, such as max rule, sum rule, ranked voting, or weighted plurality voting;
19 ͑2͒ investigation of a more general set of manipulation tools that are instrumental in image doctoring; and ͑3͒ singular value decomposition and nonnegative matrix factorization are powerful tools for matrix analysis, and its potential directly reflects on images, when image blocks are viewed as nonnegative matrices.
One intriguing question is whether and how to create images and image manipulations that will go through undetected by our scheme, especially if all the measures of Fig. 10 Performance of blind classifiers. Each bar denotes a different way of selecting features. The first three bars denote the feature set when we limit the choice to the respective BSM, IQM, and HOWS categories. Both the JFS and the CFS select from all categories but in two different styles, as explained in Sec. 3. Fig. 11 Performance of semiblind and blind classifiers. The left bars denote the strength-blind manipulation-clairvoyant classifier, where both features and regression coefficients could be trained; finally, the right bars denote the strength-blind, manipulation-clairvoyant classifier, where the core of features were common and fixed but regression coefficients could be trained.
Fig. 12
Pie charts of feature sets for the JFS ͑left͒ and CFS ͑right͒ in blind mode.
the method are publicly available. Figures 7-10 give some clues as to the probability of avoiding being caught. Some manipulations are more easily detected; for example, Fig.  7͑a͒ shows that the rotation expert is able detect even 1 deg of rotation with 88% success in clairvoyant mode; on the other hand, the success rate for contrast enhancement experts is inferior. As can be expected from any doctoring detector, our approach also has a weak belly to very small levels of manipulations. On the other hand, only objective psychovisual measures can decide at what point the doctoring effects impact on the semantic content. · Thus, the agreement variable for the pixel x i is obtained as
Appendix A: BSM Features
, where ␦ is the Dirac delta selector. Finally, the accumulated agreements can be defined as 
These four variables ͕a , b , c , d͖ can be interpreted as the one-step cooccurrence values of the binary images. Obviously these cooccurrences are defined for a specific bit plane b, though the bit plane parameter was not shown for the sake simplicity. Normalizing the histograms of the agreement scores for the bth bit plane ͓where now ␣ i j = ␣ i j ͑b͔͒ one obtains for the j'th cooccurrence:
Three categories of similarity measures are derived from the local bit plane features, as detailed next. The first group of features uses various functional combinations of local binary texture measures. Actually, as pointed out in the first row of the Table 1 , the differential measure dm i k,l = m i k − m i l over adjacent bit plane pairs, the kth and the lth, is used. The feature selection algorithm selects none, one, or more of the appropriate bit plane pairs
.. ,10͖ that are found to be the most effective in classification. In Table 1 , therefore, we do not indicate the specific bit planes used, since these are to be chosen adaptively by the feature selection algorithm. Thus, this first group results in 60 features, since there are 10 varieties, each computed over six adjacent bit plane pairs. The chosen bit plane pairs vary from manipulation to manipulation; for example, blurring demands dm 2 between bit planes 7-8 and 3-4, that is, ͕dm 2 3,4 , dm 2 7,8 ͖. A second group of features consists of histogram and entropic features. Based on normalized four-bin histograms, we define the minimum histogram difference dm 11 and the absolute histogram difference measures dm 12 , binary mutual entropy dm 13 , and binary Kullback-Leibler distance dm 14 , as also given in Table 1 . There are therefore overall 24 such features defined over the six bit plane pairs.
The third set of measures, dm 14 , ... ,dm 17 are somewhat different in that we use the neighborhood-weighting mask proposed by Ojala. For each binary image we obtain a 512-bin histogram using directional weighting of the eight neighbors. We have in total 24 features, with four varieties computed over six bit planes. To give a flavor of, binary similarity measures we consider the Ojala 18 histograms. For each binary image on the bth bit plane we obtain a 512-bin histogram based on the weighted eight neighborhood, as in Fig. 15 . For each eight-neighborhood pattern, the histogram bin numbered is augmented by 1.
Finally, the entropic measures are defined as follows. Let the two normalized histograms be denoted as S n ␤ , n =0, ... ,255 and ␤ = 3 , . . . , 7. The resulting Ojala measure is the mutual entropy between the two distributions belonging to adjacent planes b and b +1:
Appendix B: IQM Features
In this appendix we define and describe image quality measures considered. In these definitions the pixel lattices of images A and B are referred to as A͑i , j͒ and B͑i , j͒, i , j =1, ... ,N, as the lattices are assumed to have dimensions N ϫ N. The pixels can take values from the set ͕0, ... ,255͖. Similarly, we denote the multispectral components of an image at the pixel position i , j, and in band k, as C k ͑i , j͒, where k =1, ... ,K. The boldface symbols C͑i , j͒ and Ĉ ͑i , j͒ indicate the multispectral pixel vectors at position ͑i , j͒. For example, for the color images in the RGB representation one has C͑i , j͒ = ͓R͑i , j͒G͑i , j͒B͑i , j͔͒ T . All these definitions are summarized in Table 9 .
Thus, for example, the power in the k'th band can be calculated as k 2 = ͚ i,j=0 N−1 C k ͑i , j͒ 2 . All these quantities with an additional hat, i.e., Ĉ k ͑i , j͒, Ĉ etc., correspond to the dis- torted versions of the same original image. As a case in point, the expression ʈC͑i , j͒ − Ĉ ͑i , j͒ʈ
2 denotes the sum of errors in the spectral components at a given pixel position i , j. Similarly, the error expression in the last row of Table 9 expands as k
In the specific case of RGB color images, we occasionally revert to the notations ͕R , G , B͖ and ͕R , Ĝ , B ͖.
Quality metrics can be categorized into six groups according to the type of information they use. 10 The categories used are 1. pixel-difference-based measures such as mean square distortion 2. correlation-based measures, that is, correlation of pixels, or of the vector angular directions 3. edge-based measures, that is, displacement of edge positions or their consistency across resolution levels 4. spectral distance-based measures, that is, Fourier magnitude and/or phase spectral discrepancy on a block basis 5. context-based measures, that is penalties based on various functionals of the multidimensional context probability 6. HVS-based measures, measures either based on the HVS-weighted spectral distortion measures or ͑dis-͒similarity criteria used in image base browsing functions.
Pixel-Difference-Based Measures

Mean square error
where K = 3 for RGB color images.
Correlation Based Measures
Normalized cross-correlation measure
The closeness between two digital images can be quantified in terms of the normalized cross-correlation function: 
Mean angle similarity
A variant of correlation-based measures can be obtained by considering the statistics of the angles between the pixel vectors of the original and distorted images. Similar "colors" will result in vectors pointing in the same direction, while significantly different colors will point in different directions in the C space. Since we deal with positive vectors C and Ĉ , we are constrained to one quadrant of the Cartesian space. Thus, the normalization factor of 2 / is related to the fact that the maximum difference attained will be / 2. The combined angular correlation and magnitude difference between two vectors can be defined as follows: We can use the moments of the spectral ͑chromatic͒ vector differences as distortion measures. To this effect we have used the mean of the angle difference ͑D 4 ͒ and the mean of the combined angle-magnitude difference ͑D 5 ͒ as in the following two measures: 
Edge-Based Measures
The edges form the most informative part in images. Some examples of edge degradations are discontinuities in the edge, decrease of edge sharpness by smoothing effects, offset of edge position, missing edge points, falsely detected edge points, etc.
Laplacian mean square error:
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where O͓C k ͑i , j͔͒ = C k ͑i +1, j͒ + C k ͑i −1, j͒ + C k ͑i , j +1͒ + C k ͑i , j −1͒ −4C k ͑i , j͒. 
Normalized absolute error
͉U͓C k ͑i, j͔͉͒ .
Spectral Distance Measures
In this category, we consider the distortion penalty functions obtained from the complex Fourier spectrum of images. Let the DFTs of the k'th band of the original and coded image be denoted by ⌫ k ͑u , v͒ and ⌫ k ͑u , v͒, respectively. The spectra are defined as 
Spectral phase distortion
͉͑u,v͒ − ͑u,v͉͒ 2 .
